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Résumé : Dans cet article, j’examine les écrits influents de Harry Collins
consacrés à la connaissance tacite. Je me penche en particulier sur son récent
livre, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010] ou TEK, qui est sans doute
l’exposé le plus complet et le plus systématique de la manière dont Collins
conçoit la connaissance tacite. Tout en examinant la connaissance tacite telle
qu’elle est développée dans cette contribution, je dégage, au sein des contri-
butions majeures de Collins à la sociologie de la connaissance scientifique en
général, une tension sous-jacente, entre d’un côté le réalisme qui sous-tend sa
notion de « connaissance tacite », et, de l’autre, le constructivisme qui sous-
tend son concept célèbre de « régression de l’expérimentateur » (tel qu’éla-
boré par exemple dans son fameux livre Changing Order [Collins 1992]). Pour
construire cet argument, j’accorde une attention particulière à un aspect des
écrits de Collins sur la connaissance tacite qui, je pense, mérite un examen
plus approfondi : à savoir les types de support empirique qui sont invoqués
en faveur des caractéristiques et des propriétés de la connaissance tacite visée.
En bref, je pose des questions à propos de certains des exemples empiriques
spécifiques invoqués et des conclusions qui en sont tirées.
Abstract: In this paper I examine Harry Collins’s influential writing on tacit
knowledge. In particular I turn my attention to his recent book, Tacit and
Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], or TEK, which is arguably the most com-
plete and systematic statement of what he means by the term “tacit knowl-
edge”. As well as examining tacit knowledge as elaborated in this contribution,
I draw out an underlying tension in Collins’s major contributions to the so-
ciology of scientific knowledge in general between the realism underlying his
notion of “tacit knowledge” and the constructivism underlying his other well-
known concept, “the experimenters’ regress” (as for instance, elaborated in his
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well-known book Changing Order [Collins 1992]). In order to make this argu-
ment I pay particular attention to an aspect of his writings on tacit knowledge
which I think is worthy of closer examination: namely the sorts of empirical
support claimed for the features and properties of tacit knowledge to which
he attends. In short I ask questions concerning some of the specific empirical
examples and the conclusions he draws from them.
I want to begin this paper by praising Collins’s latest book on tacit knowl-
edge Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [TEK] [Collins 2010]. I should declare a
certain degree of self-interest. Collins was my mentor and I have ended up
becoming his friend, colleague, and coauthor. This of course only makes my
task harder! TEK overall is vintage Collins. It is his best book since Changing
Order [Collins 1992], not only because it is one of his shortest (and hence liable
to be read as opposed to his massive and impressive tome on gravitational radi-
ation, Gravity’s Shadow: The Search for Gravitational Waves [Collins 2004]),
but also because as with the earlier book, Changing Order, Collins shows great
ingenuity in the examples he conjures up. Changing Order brought us not only
a rich array of fieldwork instances, but also funny creative ideas like Popper
Mice to illustrate the problem of induction. In TEK we also find numerous
tantalizing ideas and examples culled not only from his own fieldwork, but
also from his own experiences, reading, imagination, and his earlier books.
Some gems include: a sociological version of string theory with analog and
digital strings (to be used in thinking about explicit knowledge); husbands
grunting at wives (is it a language?); saluting machines (we would be mad to
build them); vegetarian dogs (could they even exist?), how androids learn to
dance on Star Trek (can a robot carry out improvisation in the same manner
as learning the basic steps of dancing?) and my personal favorite, Chinese
cars exiting highways by the entrance ramp and the oncoming cars splitting
neatly into two lanes to let the exiting vehicle pass (an example of what he
calls Collective Tacit Knowledge). I have never been to China to witness such
a terrifying spectacle.
TEK also has a nice counter-intuitive feel to it in that Collins spends
the early part spelling out what explicit knowledge is, arguing that in a way
the deeper issue is exploring what explicit knowledge consists of as opposed
to tacit knowledge. Who is TEK written for? It is written for a wide au-
dience who use and ponder the idea of tacit knowledge. This includes not
only Science and Technology Studies scholars, philosophers and psychologists,
but also people in business schools, educators, and organizational sociologists.
The book should also be of wide interest to researchers working in robotics,
HCI, and Artificial Intelligence. The main theoretical protagonists are, the
chemist turned philosopher, Michael Polanyi—who first introduced the term
tacit knowledge—and the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus, who agrees with Collins
on most issues but who according to Collins gets it wrong mainly on the issue
of Somatic Tacit Knowledge. To be added to this list is Bruno Latour and
his many followers and acolytes (and especially the “lazy” followers!) whom
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Collins disagrees with. Theoretically TEK builds on the three inspirations for
much of Collins’s work; the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, Peter Winch’s
little book The Idea of a Social Science and Thomas Kuhn—all, of course,
given a sufficiently radical reading.
The main idea in the section of the book on tacit knowledge is to show that
the term has been used to cover three different sorts of knowledge that need
to be separated. Collins calls these three forms of tacit knowledge, Relational,
Somatic, and Social. Relational Tacit Knowledge is knowledge that could be
spelt out in principle but often stays implicit because of the way we organize
tasks and pass on knowledge. In short whether it is made explicit or not
depends on our relation to other communities or to the individual to whom
the tacit knowledge is being passed on to. For instance, a crucial component
in the replication of a scientific experiment, such as the length of leads on
an electronic component in building early lasers, might not be specified by
the scientists even though getting its length correct may be crucial to other
scientists trying to gain the skills to repeat the experiment. The length could in
principle be made explicit. Somatic Tacit Knowledge is tied to the corporeality
of our bodies; it is in a way a form of bodily knowledge, such as learnt in
playing a musical instrument. Your hands will correctly glide over the keys
of the piano to play a Scott Joplin piano rag even though your mind may
not be explicating each note you need to hit. Social Tacit Knowledge, the
third form, is clearly for Collins the most important and is unlike Relational
Tacit Knowledge which Collins calls “weak tacit knowledge”, and Somatic Tacit
Knowledge which Collins calls “medium”. It is the sort of knowledge which is
very specific to the living of a particular form of life, such as acquiring the
rules to follow the rules—a point made by Wittgenstein and Winch. Because
it depends upon the meaningful interpretive dimension of social life as lived
within a very specific social context, even in principle Social Tacit Knowledge
cannot be explicated in full. It is the sort of knowledge one needs to exit the
highway safely in China.
This new three-fold distinction between, Relational, Somatic and Social
Tacit Knowledge, reveals that Collins’s own thinking on tacit knowledge is
itself in movement. To make the new categories work he has to reinterpret
his own earlier studies, such as the classic study of scientists building and
attempting to replicate the first TEA Lasers [Collins 1974], the work of UK
scientists trying to reproduce a measurement carried out on small sapphire
crystals in the Soviet Union, known as the Q of Sapphire [Collins 2001], and
parts of his earlier book, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent
Machines [Collins 1990] on the debates over expert systems and their role in
Artificial Intelligence. Collins also uses ideas developed in earlier books such
as the distinction between mimeomorphic and polimorphic actions outlined
in the book with Martin Kusch, The Shape of Actions: What Humans and
Machines Can Do [Collins & Kusch 1998], which is itself a refinement of the
distinction between what he called “behavioral specific actions” and other sorts
of actions first delineated in Artificial Experts. Collins also adds to the mix by
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introducing the distinctions between different kinds of expertise, such as inter-
actional and contributory expertise outlined in the book with Robert Evans,
Rethinking Expertise [Collins & Evans 2007].
I want to focus here upon the sort of evidence Collins claims in support of
his ideas of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is famously a difficult thing to
show empirically because due to its nature it cannot be articulated. It is in
a way a negative (in the sense of something absent) and showing a negative
empirically is always hard. One way to show it in the case of science is to point
to the difficulties scientists have in repeating experiments and measurements.
At one time, T(1), these measurements or experiments cannot be performed
successfully, but at a later time, T(2), they can be successfully carried out.
What has changed between T(1) and T(2)? The answer is that the scientists
have acquired tacit knowledge. It is thus necessary to show that something was
missing from the experimental activity which occurred at T(1). But the exact
tacit knowledge that was missing can only be inferred because if what was
missing could be spelt out it would mean that tacit knowledge could itself be
explicated and it is the defining feature of tacit knowledge that it is knowledge
which cannot be explicated (except of course in the case of Relational Tacit
Knowledge—see below). Collins makes great use of examples where we can
infer the missing knowledge. He draws especially upon his own earlier TEA
laser study and the later Q of Sapphire study. These are both examples where
scientists fail to do something earlier but are successful later. By interacting
with and studying the scientists who struggle and fail and then who later
succeed, Collins uses a kind of ethnographic fieldwork to elicit the missing
tacit knowledge. His fieldwork is very rich, such as the follow up TEA laser
study completed in 1975 with Robert Harrison where Collins actually worked
alongside Harrison as he struggled to make his laser work [Collins & Harrison
1975]. The later “success” in replications forms as it were a control experiment
as Collins and the scientists ponder over what exactly has changed and what
they didn’t grasp quite right in their earlier failed attempts. These studies
seem quite convincing at pulling out the inferred tacit knowledge and are some
of the most careful studies of this type in the sociology of science. But note
that these two studies mainly show what Collins now calls “Relational” Tacit
Knowledge—that is tacit knowledge that could in principle be made explicit
given the right circumstances. This gives the studies in hindsight a certain
persuasiveness because some of the missing tacit knowledge can actually be
explicated because it is relational in character.
1 A demonstrable example: broken text and
repair
Now I move on to examine some of the newer different examples Collins brings
to the table in his new book TEK. Collins’s examples at first blush seem
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compelling. One of the most striking come in a section where Collins wants to
show how we as humans are good at repairing passages of speech we mishear
or words which are misspelled. We do this routinely by trying to make sense
of the words. Collins highlights two paragraphs of text which both contain
“broken” words (words that are misspelled) [TEK, 115]. One paragraph (the
first one) appears as gibberish with the words not only misspelled but also
seemingly rearranged randomly whilst the second paragraph, although full of
misspellings, keeps the words in the correct order. The reader is invited to read
the text him or herself. The example is used to demonstrate “our everyday
ability to make good something broken while hardly thinking about it as long
as it makes sense to us” [TEK, 115]. I participated in this demonstration
myself as a reader. Sure enough, when instructed to read the first passage,
I could not make sense of it and quickly moved on to the second passage
which initially looked equally baffling and soon I had that “Ah hah” moment
as I found the second passage, although containing the same broken words,
started to make sense.
Collins uses this as a “demonstration” to argue for three things: (1) that
because most readers can read the second passage so easily it must mean that
reading is accomplished by searching for meaning, (2) that although Collins’s
own spell-checker highlighted each word with a jagged red line, the copy ed-
itor at Chicago University Press will not even think about correcting either
paragraph, and (3), that the reader will know when to give up reading the
first passage but will persevere when reading the second.
Now it might seem churlish to try and cast doubt upon the power of this
demonstration but I will try to do so. The first thing to note is that readers,
especially reading books quickly, do not all read in a linear manner. In other
words Collins has no control over how the reader actually reads the text and
this may make a difference. For example readers often scan texts that they
are about to read. When confronted with the two texts which appeared both
at the scanning level to be gibberish I noticed my eyes were drawn to the
misspelled word “Cmabrigde” which appears in both texts as this happens to
be how I regularly mistype the word Cambridge (I often invert the order of
letters when I type quickly, for example frequently typing “teh” for the word
“the”). In the second text the misspelled word “Cmabrigde” is followed by the
word “Uinervtisy” which is sometimes how I mistype the word “University”
and which may have made me think that reading the second text would be
more rewarding as it contained the meaningful (but misspelled) pair of words
“Cambridge University”. This all of course all happens in the flash of an eye,
but like subliminal cueing in advertizing experiments, this may make a real
difference to how the task is carried out and what the results mean. One could
also point out that the statement (2) above is not strictly correct as there are
actually 41 words correctly spelt in both paragraphs, so Collins’s spell-checker
will not highlight “each word” as is claimed. There are also plenty of copy edi-
tors who would try to correct or at least highlight the misspelled marked words
despite it being part of an exercise. In my empirical work as a sociologist I
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sometimes use transcribed speech excerpts with phonetic spellings and, despite
explicit instructions, proofreaders and editors are always trying to clean them
up. One could also point out on (1) that some subset of people (including my
father and sister) suffer from a reading disability where they have to process
each letter in a word at a time and hence would find it extremely difficult
to read the second passage as well, and hence some small subset of readers
will not as claimed in (3) persevere when reading the second passage. Also I
noticed that the sentences in the two paragraphs are of different lengths. The
first paragraph starts with a 7-word sentence and the second with a 12-word
sentence. I am assuming this does not matter but it is a difference. Another
difference is that the first paragraph contains a grammatical clue as to it being
gibberish which is not present in the second paragraph—a question mark ap-
pears in the middle of the word “huh?and”. Maybe this difference provides an
added sign that the first paragraph is likely to be “gibberish” and not worth
pursuing. Knowing this—when to stop reading a text because it is likely
to be gibberish—is what Collins calls part of “Collective Tacit Knowledge”.
So the example would still work, but it would work to make a different point,
namely demonstrating our ability to recognize gibberish rather than our ability
to do repair.
These are, of course, quibbles—overall the demonstration works, it is con-
vincing in the way that demonstrations should be according to Collins’s own
writing on the difference between experiments and demonstrations. In his
book The Golem at Large he claims, “demonstrations are designed to educate
and convince” [Collins & Pinch 1998]. The reader is not being asked to exper-
iment with the text in the sense of finding out new things about how reading
broken text might be achieved but rather we are being asked to be convinced
of “our everyday ability to repair”. And at first blush I was convinced.
2 A canonical example: riding a bike
I chose the broken text example because I believe that the “demonstration”
character of many of the examples gives them a different warrant than the
fieldwork cases. It is the very “demonstrable” quality of the examples which
makes them powerful. This is the beauty of the most famous example of all in
the tacit knowledge canon: Michael Polanyi’s example of riding a bicycle. We
do not have to describe the detailed process of learning to ride a bicycle when
using this example because nearly everyone knows from their own experience
how they learnt to ride a bicycle. The key part of learning to ride a bicycle—
the ability to balance and ride independently—seems to have been acquired in
the same manner by everyone at least since bicycling became a common part
of our shared culture. Nearly every child has shared that thrilling moment
of “going solo”—riding on their own without training wheels or a parent or
sibling pushing them and knows they have accomplished something. Bicycle
riders also readily agree, as soon as it is pointed out to them, that they didn’t
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acquire this knowledge by reading books or by learning about the physics of
balance or by studying in a master class for bike riders! There is no need to
actually stage a demonstration of all this because everyone is familiar with
it already from personal experience. In a way the riddle of how to show
that something that is tacit and hence missing can be made convincing is by
appealing to a canonical example based on something even more compelling
than demonstration—personal experience—a move which appeals to “what
everyone knows” and which is therefore pointless to question.
Many of the examples given in TEK are backed up with Collins’s own
fieldwork where he teases out exactly how the knowledge is acquired and what
sort it is. But nearly all these examples are given in Chapter 4 on “Relational
Tacit Knowledge”. It turns out that Chapter 6, “Collective Tacit Knowledge
and Social Cartesianism”, the aspect Collins considers the “irreducible heart-
land of the subject”, has the fewest examples from fieldwork. Indeed the only
boxed example is the famous quote from Wittgenstein about if a lion could
speak we would not be able to understand him. He does say that fuller treat-
ments are available elsewhere and that he will only elaborate on issues on how
Collective Tacit Knowledge relates to Somatic Tacit Knowledge (discussed in
Chapter 5). But I worried about this lack of detailed case studies in the heart-
land of the subject.
There is also something very different about the science examples Collins
discusses from his fieldwork and other examples in the book. In the science
examples there are very clear criteria for knowing when the scientists have
acquired sufficient tacit knowledge to be successful. In the TEA laser exam-
ple this is famously when the laser will vaporize a block of concrete. The
Q of Sapphire example is messier because there is no dramatic outcome to
show that the correct outcome has been achieved, but, as Collins points out
in his fieldwork on that case, it seems clear when the scientists are able to
correctly measure the Q factor, obtaining the same high values in the UK
as were obtained in similar circumstances as earlier by the Russian group.
The successful measurement, unlike, say, results in parapsychology and cold
fusion, does not contradict existing knowledge. Thus the Western scientists
when they first learned of and later watched the Russian scientists at work in
their laboratory in Moscow successfully measuring the Q of Sapphire did not
doubt the measurement could be performed. They came to trust the Russian
scientists enough to believe that the high Q could be measured, even though
at that stage they were not able to repeat the measurement themselves. Thus
when the Q of Sapphire was finally measured in the UK it was immediately
recognized that it had been done so successfully. Of course as Collins points
out, accomplishing a task such as building a laser successfully once does not
guarantee that you can do it again—the measure of the skill being acquired is
being able to reproduce the result of interest. This is an important point and
an issue we will return to later.
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3 Bicycle riding revisited
This lack of examples for the existence of Collective Tacit Knowledge puzzled
me. But perhaps there is something about the very notion of Collective Tacit
Knowledge which makes it hard or impossible to illustrate with “knock down
examples” or “demonstrations” or even with convincing fieldwork. Take for
instance again the famous bike riding example which Collins now recasts as
demonstrating Somatic Tacit Knowledge. Recently I observed my neighbors’
five-year old son, Sky, learn to ride a bike. He learnt in the standard way
by his mother pushing him and letting go on the quiet suburban dead-end
street on which we live. As we stood around on our driveway celebrating
Sky’s success on the road, Sky turned into our driveway at high speed and,
much to our horror, we realized he had no clue as to how to stop or, as Collins
would put it, “navigate pedestrian traffic”. We leapt out of way as he skidded
off his bike on the tarmac drive—he burst into tears, his pride hurt more than
his body. This example is on the border line of Sky mastering bicycle riding
as part of Somatic Tacit Knowledge and dealing with traffic (according to
Collins part of Collective Tacit Knowledge). But how would we convincingly
demonstrate how and when Sky had achieved Collective Tacit Knowledge as
a competent bike rider? In other words how do we tell that he has learnt
how to deal with traffic? We would have to follow him as he negotiated the
main road at the end of our street, turning in various configurations, riding
with other riders, riding in traffic of various sorts, negotiating Ithaca’s one
and only round-about, and so on. But how would we be able to show that
he had acquired such knowledge? One way to proceed empirically might be
to find more instances such as the “crash” in our driveway where he had not
acquired such skills. My point is this: it is much harder empirically to show
what is at stake and whether tacit knowledge has been acquired with respect to
Collective Tacit Knowledge. Another personal example of bike riding can be
used to make the point.
I learnt to ride a bike as most British kids do. Because our family did not
have a car I rode everywhere most of my childhood including to and from school
every day along busy roads. I used to think of myself as a fairly accomplished
bicycle rider. That was until I spent six months in the Netherlands! Collins
claims that the Collective Tacit Knowledge needed for bicycle riding is different
even for different cities, such as Amsterdam. I was in Maastricht. We had no
car and since I had to get my daughter to school quite far away I borrowed a
bicycle and rode with her on the back to and from school every day. Certainly
bicycling in the Netherlands required me to learn new skills, negotiating bicycle
traffic lights, knowing how to avoid young Dutch men and women on motor
scooters who scooted along nonchalantly with cigarette in hand sharing the
same bicycle paths as the much slower bicycles, and so on. One day my Dutch
collaborator, Karin, passed me on her bike with her own daughter. Later that
day over drinks she said she had to tell me that although I was managing OK
on my bicycle I was not riding in “the Dutch way”. If TEK had been available
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then, and I had read it, maybe I would have left the conversation at that
and said: “Duh, of course, that is to be expected I haven’t yet mastered the
Collective Tacit Knowledge necessary.” My own reaction was that of a typical
Brit. I was upset at this assault on my bicycle riding prowess and quizzed
her as to my inadequacies. The confidence and speed of Dutch riders and
their elan in riding is notoriously high, but I felt that I had managed some
of that. As she discussed it more and more I realized that her position was
“that she just knew” I wasn’t doing it the “Dutch way”. Casting aspersions
on the behavior of the non-natives is a familiar trope from anthropology and
it is often used in everyday matters to do with driving or riding behavior. If
you drive around Boston long enough with a Boston driver you will hear talk
about “out-of-town drivers”. Brits arriving in my town in America will talk
about “lousy American drivers”. It seems part of common folk wisdom that
there are ways of riding/driving which develop in particular national contexts
or even cities—they are part of the identity of living in such cities. Such ways
of riding/driving are according to Collins part of Collective Tacit Knowledge.
But let us invoke for a moment another part of sociology—“impression
management” [Goffman 1959], the social construction of identity, and so on.
Supposing the claims that Maastricht bike riders have a particular style which
“damn foreigners” can never achieve are merely part of identity building, how
would we prove it? Where would the borderline between identity building
and Collective Tacit Knowledge be placed and how would we as sociologists
study it? One could imagine collecting video footage of bike riding and doing
double-blind tests; one could imagine putting such a matter to the tests of
Collins’s imitation game, but Collins does not do this in this book. He merely
asserts it as something we all know. Here the politics of what is at stake when
particular claims to hold tacit knowledge are made are relevant [Doing 2007]. I
may claim that I have the Collective Tacit Knowledge to pass as a Maastricht
rider and Karin may deny it. Who is right and how do we tell, especially given
that we both have an “interest” in being right?
4 Judging skill in practice
So how do we actually know in cases of skill acquisition that someone has
acquired the requisite tacit knowledge? Here is another obvious point—many
skills require that judgment of the neophyte be made by someone who possesses
the skill already and hence is capable of recognizing that the skill has been
acquired. This is how many somatic skills are assessed. For example, one
of the most difficult skills veterinary surgeons need to acquire is how to use
the scalpel to open the skin of the animal on the surgeon’s table. Too much
pressure could damage delicate internal organs, not enough pressure could
lead to several cuts each of greater depth risking infection, more trauma and
so on [Pinch, Collins & Carbone 1996]. In this case skilled surgeons are used
to assess and guide the progress of the neophyte. Most such skills are learnt
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gradually and credentialed in some way—but for many ordinary tasks where
Collins claims Collective Tacit Knowledge is in operation, credentials are not
applicable. Karin has no credentialed expertise that she is a proper Dutch
bike rider. Perhaps she is an outlier—an over-meticulous Dutch rider whom
other Dutch riders would never take seriously?
But then assessing skill is in many cases not straightforward because there
are often multiple audiences for the skill who possess different levels of skill
themselves. Take piano playing for instance. My daughter will play beautifully
to my ears and I will be as fully moved as hearing any possible piano player, but
then I am not a piano player and she will report back to me that her teacher
is not satisfied with her playing. This is something performing musicians face
all the time. I play in two musical groups both of whom perform live. I
cannot tell you the number of times after a performance when we in the band
say to each other “Well we really sucked tonight” only to receive extravagant
plaudits from the audience. The truth of the matter is that it takes a lower
level of skill to convince most audiences in clubs (and here the genre of music,
location, and quality of the sound system, are also important as well as the skill
set expected of the audience—playing in Berlin with the Berlin Philharmonic
Orchestra before audience members reading the score is very different in terms
of the skill set of the audience). The point is this, if we take skill as something
which is staged and performed with possibly an audience present then whether
the skill has been accomplished or not becomes a much less straightforward
question. In many of Collins’s examples there is no audience or issue of people
judging a skill—it seems that the skill is either carried out or not carried
out. In short by removing the context or any possibility of disagreement this
encourages an over-realist notion of skill.
I will use yet another example to show how this could change the analysis.
Take again piano playing. The way kids learn to play piano in England and
the US is that they have specialized teachers and their skills are assessed
periodically by a system of tests which enables skilled practitioners to delineate
the exact “level” your child is at. In New York State (where I live) your child
has to play every year for an outside judge (at an event misnamed “festival”)
who will grade the performance in terms of different musical criteria such as
“interpretation”, “technique”, and “dynamics”. This then is a fine-grained skill
assessment system based upon skilled practitioners doing the judging. But
why should we accept this at face value? There are many ways to deconstruct
such results—often parents don’t get to do so but I would like to relate an
incident where the deconstructive work was done for me. My daughter was
having her last such exam. Usually she obtains the grade of “superior” and
three superiors in this system equals a gold cup. She had already won one gold
cup and this was her last chance to win a second one—she just needed one
more superior grade. She would graduate high school that year and would no
longer be eligible. She was naturally nervous; she played her pieces—a rather
tricky Rachmaninov piece as I recall—and eventually came out crestfallen to
learn she had obtained only an “excellent” grade (one grade below superior).
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No gold cup, alas! But later that evening her piano teacher called to say that
the examiner had thought she was of “superior” quality, but felt that she was
just holding back for some reason during this one performance. The examiner
said she had wished she had known it was my daughter’s last chance because
if she had known that she would have given her a “superior”. In short what
I am pointing to is that there is a whole sociology of judging skill—judging
skill itself is a skill—in Collins’s terms it involves Collective Tacit Knowledge:
as to what stage the pupil is at, when to be harsh or generous and so on.
The assessment of skill, the system of grading skills, and how this works for
multiple audiences seems to be missing from Collins’s account.
5 Constructivist and realist tensions in
Collins’s work
Why does all this matter? It matters crucially because of Collins’s other
important early contribution to the sociology of scientific knowledge, his de-
lineating of what has become known as the “experimenter’s regress” [Collins
1992]. Unlike the TEA laser case, there are a set of cases of experiments in
science where the correct outcome of an experiment is ambiguous. These are
the sorts of cases dealt with in the Golem series of books [Collins & Pinch
1994], [Collins & Pinch 2006]. For instance, claims to find cold fusion, large
fluxes of gravity waves, or Vitamin C as a cure for cancer are all cases where
experimental outcomes are highly contested. In such cases for a while it is not
clear who are the skilled experimenters—the ones claiming the phenomenon
of say cold fusion, or their detractors who find no evidence of cold fusion.
There is no independent way of measuring the skills or competence of experi-
menters in such cases. There is no equivalent to, say, vaporizing the block of
concrete as in the TEA laser case. Who has the requisite tacit knowledge in
the cold fusion case? Is it Pons and Fleishmann who claim to manifest the
phenomenon of cold fusion or the skeptics at MIT whose experiments fail to
show cold fusion? In short there seems in these sorts of cases no way to “grade”
tacit knowledge (for a similar point with a more meticulous working through
of examples, see [Soler 2011]). Which of course is the very point of the notion
of an experimenter’s regress. How does this constructivist side of Collins’s
work fit with his realist account of tacit knowledge (realist in the sense that
the individual or the community either have such knowledge or do not)?1 The
sociologist of science trained in the sociology of scientific knowledge might
want to say that the outcome of the cold fusion controversy has been con-
1. This tension between realism and constructivism seems different to earlier de-
bates about reflexivity and Collins’s claims that he is realist about the social but
constructivist about the scientists’ claims. In this case it would seem that claims
made by the participants to have particular sorts of tacit knowledge are themselves
subject to interpretative flexibility.
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structed in such a way that we now know Pons and Fleischmann did not have
the genuine tacit knowledge to produce cold fusion. In short the consensus
moved against them. But before the consensus has been reached how could
we tell? My answer would have to involve a form of methodological relativism
whereby I would say that for one community Pons and Fleischmann did have
the requisite tacit knowledge but that for another community they did not.
This immediately makes tacit knowledge much less realist and something that
is also socially constructed with the phenomenon. We do not know who has
the requisite tacit knowledge until the controversy is settled. Indeed with a
nod to Collins we can frame this as the TACIT KNOWLEDGE REGRESS.
Q: How do I know in a case at the research frontiers of contested knowledge
who has the requisite tacit knowledge?
A: It depends on whose experiments are deemed to be the correct ones.
Q: How do I know whose experiments are the correct ones?
A: It all depends on who has the requisite tacit knowledge.
Q: How do I know who has the requisite tacit knowledge?
And so on...
Even if Collins does not want to buy into the tacit knowledge regress it
would seem that his work could be enriched by considering more how tacit
knowledge is performed, the audience for such performances, and how insti-
tutions are set up (such as schools which grade and credential training in
musicianship) and operate to assess and grade skilled performances. It would
provide at the least a fuller picture of tacit knowledge.
My argument in this paper is that with the publication of TEK Collins has
provided us with the most complete account of tacit knowledge to date. His
arguments and examples concerning Relational Tacit Knowledge seem thor-
oughly convincing. I have not here entered into the debate over the importance
or not of Somatic Tacit Knowledge. Collins plays that aspect down in favor
of what he calls Collective Tacit Knowledge. Although Collins maintains that
he has provided plenty of examples of Collective Tacit Knowledge elsewhere,
in TEK we are left mainly with anecdotes from Collins own experience of so-
cial life to drive home the point. I have offered some counter-examples from
my own experience to at least interrogate the veracity of such examples and
to draw attention to what might be at stake in the sorts of examples Collins
provides. By pushing on the realist versus constructivist nature of Collins’s
work I am pointing to a fundamental paradox of which Collins of course is well
aware. Collins likes to do what he calls “compartmentalization” whereby he
can avoid arguments he generates in one area being applied to what he deems
as a separate compartment of his endeavor. For example, he claims he is a
realist about the social and that this allows him to say without contradiction
that he has shown in a realist mode how experimental results are constructed.
He thus dodges or side-steps the issue of whether his own realist claims are
constructed or not. The same tension appears in his work on tacit knowledge.
During moments of experimenters regress tacit knowledge is constructed but
at other moments it is “really” there for participants to possess. I suggest that
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rather than relying on strategies such as compartmentalization which make the
tensions go away, we should embrace an idiom of performativity which turns
the questions of how tacit knowledge is staged and performed for different
audiences, and how such assessments of tacit knowledge are institutionalized
(such as at music schools), into an empirical endeavor which might give us an
even more complete understanding of the deep mystery of tacit knowledge.
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